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SUBJECT: DAILY SUMMARY OF JAPANESE PRESS 06/16/09

INDEX:

- (1) Move to oust Aso might accelerate, following defeats of LDP-backed candidates in three mayoral elections, sharp drop in public support (Sankei)
- (2) Poll on public attitude toward politics (Tokyo Shimbun)
- (3) Growing nuclear threat from North Korea: Full-scale discussion of capability to attack enemy bases urged (Yomiuri)
- (4) Foreign Ministry fears public opinion; Prime Minister must lead the denuclearization effort without leaving everything to the United States (Asahi)
- (5) Financial Services Agency to call for thorough identity verification in relation to DPRK sanctions (Nikkei)
- (6) Editorial: Monetary authorities of Japan, U.S., and Europe should give consideration to long-term interest rates (Nikkei)
- (7) Warning about three anti-U.S. stances - Part one of series "DPJ's risky 'fraternal' foreign policy" (Sankei)
- (8) Japan must formulate security policy in context of relations with Asia (Sekai)
- (9) Prime Minister's schedule, June 14, 2009 (Nikkei)

ARTICLES:

- (1) Move to oust Aso might accelerate, following defeats of LDP-backed candidates in three mayoral elections, sharp drop in

public support

SANKEI (Top Play) (Slightly abridged)
June 16, 2009

The candidate backed by the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) was defeated by the candidate endorsed by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the Chiba mayoral election, following the LDP-backed candidates' defeats in the Nagoya and Saitama mayoral elections. The LDP has also seen public support of the cabinet of Prime Minister Taro Aso sharply dropping following the dismissal of Kunio Hatoyama from the post of internal affairs and communications minister over a dispute with between him and Japan Post. Aso has now been driven into a corner. LDP members have already started moving to speed up the party presidential election. If the LDP loses the Shizuoka gubernatorial election on July 5 and the Tokyo metropolitan assembly election on July 12, the "dump Aso" move might accelerate at one stroke. There are two cards left for Aso; cabinet reorganization and House of Representatives dissolution. Is there any secret ploy the prime minister might use to break out of his plight?

Tokyo assembly election next month to determine administration's fate

Attending an LDP executive meeting yesterday afternoon, Aso said with a sad look: "Mr. Hatoyama's resignation is regrettable, but postal service is a public asset, and it was necessary to bring the situation back to normalcy in order to prevent the government and Japan Post from being thrown into confusion." He then instructed participants to prepare themselves to fight to win in the Shizuoka

TOKYO 00001357 002 OF 020

gubernatorial election at all costs.

In reaction to Secretary General Hiroyuki Hosoda quipping: "The margin was narrower than expected in the Chiba mayoral election," Executive Council Chairman Takashi Sasagawa argued: "Even for local elections, we should select candidates in a coolheaded manner. If we put up a hopeless candidate, the candidate will be defeated even by the rival who is neither good nor bad."

The outcome of a local election, in which local circumstances are largely reflected, should not influence the outcome of a national election. But it has already been reported that the LDP will have a hard fight in the Shizuoka gubernatorial election and the Tokyo assembly election. The LDP leadership is increasingly irritated at the situation in which they remain unable to find a subtle scheme to turn around the tables.

LDP Lower House member Taku Yamamoto set up a website of the association to move up the presidential election yesterday and has solicited views supportive of the frontloading of the election from general party members. If the party loses the Tokyo election, an increasing number of members of the ruling camp will inevitably begin to say, "It is impossible to fight under Prime Minister Aso in the Lower House election." That is why former secretary general Hidenao Nakagawa, a leader of the anti-Aso group, remains unruffled, just saying: "Everything should be decided after the Tokyo assembly election," If the LDP suffers a crushing defeat in the Tokyo election, Aso will have no choice but to stay on until the Lower House members' terms of office expire in September, but there is no guarantee that the party leadership will be able to assuage the dissatisfaction about Aso in the party.

Some members have begun to call for significantly reorganizing the cabinet and replacing the three party executives, with the aim of stopping the tailwind for the DPJ after giving a boost to the administration and then suddenly dissolving the Lower House just before the Tokyo election.

If the Lower House is dissolved before the Tokyo election, however, the Lower House election will be set for either July 26 or Aug. 2. If the cabinet reorganization does not effectively work to surge public support rates and if the LDP loses the Tokyo assembly election, the party will face a stiff uphill battle in the Lower House election. In addition, the New Komeito, which is confident of

victory in the Tokyo assembly election, is expected to raise strong opposition even if the LDP comes up with this plan.

Asked by reporters last evening for his view of the recent sharp decline of public support for his administration, Aso replied: "The responsibility for the drop in public support rests with me. What I should do is to properly implement policy measures as we have done so far." Although the prime minister has kept silent about the timing for Diet dissolution, only a few options have been left for him now.

(2) Poll on public attitude toward politics

TOKYO SHIMBUN (Page 2) (Full)
June 14, 2009

Questions & Answers
(Figures shown in percentage)

TOKYO 00001357 003 OF 020

Q: Which political party do you support?

Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) 30.6
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ or Minshuto) 33.4
New Komeito (NK) 4.6
Japanese Communist Party (JCP) 2.8
Social Democratic Party (SDP or Shaminto) 0.9
People's New Party (PNP or Kokumin Shinto) 0.3
Reform Club (RC or Kaikaku Kurabu) ---
New Party Nippon (NPN or Shinto Nippon) 0.1
Other political parties, groups 0.8
None 24.6
Don't know (D/K) + no answer (N/A) 1.9
(

Q: Are you satisfied with politics now?

Greatly satisfied 0.4
Somewhat satisfied 15.8
Not very satisfied 62.4
Not satisfied at all 20.3
D/K+N/A 1.1

Q: What do you think is problematical about politics now? Pick up to two.

No future vision of Japan 17.2
Public opinion not reflected 27.0
Taxpayers' money wasted 63.0
Government negligence like pension record keeping flaws 29.9
Bureaucracy's excessive power 15.2
Politics and money 16.9
Diet malfunctions in political situation 14.8
Political parties and politicians are only playing to the gallery, so they're untrustworthy 16.2
Other answers (O/A) 0.9
D/K+N/A 1.0

Q: What would you like politics to tackle? Pick up to two.

Economic stability, growth 43.9
Social security, such as pensions, healthcare, and nursing 68.9
Administrative, financial, political reforms 10.2
Job security 15.8
Diplomacy, defense buildup 6.4
Education 16.2
Declining birthrate 11.4
Global warming, other global issues 9.3
Safe society, such as food safety and crime prevention 12.2
O/A 0.3
D/K+N/A 0.7

Q: To what extent do you trust politicians now?

Greatly trust 0.5
Somewhat trust 22.2

Don't trust very much 61.9
Don't trust at all 14.3
D/K+N/A 1.1

Q: To what extent do you trust bureaucrats?

TOKYO 00001357 004 OF 020

Greatly trust 0.9
Somewhat trust 19.7
Don't trust very much 54.7
Don't trust at all 23.0
D/K+N/A 1.7

Q: To what extent do you look forward to the political parties now?

Very much 2.9
Somewhat 30.2
Not very much 51.0
Not at all 15.0
D/K+N/A 0.9

Q: What do you consider first when evaluating the political parties?

Their leaders 6.1
Their lawmakers 6.6
Their images 13.7
Their actual results 21.9
O/A 0.3
D/K+N/A 2.3

Q: What kind of country would you like Japan to become?

A political power 1.1
An economic power 13.6
A welfare nation 33.2
A peace nation 34.6
A cultural nation 3.9
A scientific and technological advanced nation 5.2
An ecological advanced nation 7.1
O/A 0.3
D/K+N/A 1.0

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Q: What do you think about decentralization?

Local matters should basically be left to local governments 71.1
The central government should control local governments to a certain degree 24.0
O/A 0.6
D/K+N/A 4.3

(Note) The total percentage is over 100 PERCENT for multiple-choice answers.

Polling methodology: For the survey, carried out by the Japan Polling Research Institute (Nihon Yoron Chosakai), a total of 3,000 persons were sampled out of men and women aged 20 and over at 250 locations throughout the country on a stratified two-stage random-sampling basis, so as to epitomize the nation's voting population of more than a 100 million. The survey was conducted by the Japan Polling Organization over a period of two days, June 6-7, on a face-to-face interview basis. Answers were obtained from 1,921 persons, excluding those who could not be interviewed because of their having moved away or being on a trip, or for other reasons. The retrieval rate was 64.0 PERCENT. In the breakdown of respondents, males accounted for 48.4 PERCENT, and females 51.6 PERCENT.

(3) Growing nuclear threat from North Korea: Full-scale discussion

TOKYO 00001357 005 OF 020

of capability to attack enemy bases urged

By Hidemichi Katsumata

Unrestrained actions by North Korea, such as long-range missile launches, nuclear tests, and uranium enrichment, are continuing. Discussions calling for possessing the capability to attack enemy bases have surfaced to counter the growing threat.

Japan has relegated its security to a deterrence strategy called the nuclear umbrella, which the U.S. extended during the Cold-War era to cover its allies.

However, the trustworthiness of such a strategy has been greatly undermined by North Korea's missile launches and nuclear tests, which have been carried out repeatedly in defiance of warnings from the international community.

As a result, Japan and the U.S. have introduced a missile defense (MD) system as a shield to protect themselves from ballistic missiles. However, there is no justification for putting too much confidence in the system, because three of 15 tests on Aegis vessel-based launches of SM-3 missiles failed to intercept missiles. Even though the accuracy of the MD system will improve, as long as there is even a slight possibility of the system failing to shoot down missiles, it is important to discuss possessing the capability to attack enemy bases to prepare for the threat of nuclear missiles.

However, actually attacking an enemy base would not be an easy task. This reporter probed into the Gulf War (1991), in which Iraq launched numerous ballistic missiles, using data kept by the Defense Ministry.

At that time, U.S. troops were monitoring Iraq using many military satellites, including an early warning satellite that detects the heat generated when a missile is launched, and imaging satellites, which can detect objects as small as 15 centimeters square, to destroy the ballistic Scud missiles that Iraq launched against Israel.

However, since Scud missiles were fitted on launch platforms converted from mobile trailers, even if airstrikes by cruising missile Tomahawk or aircraft did not produce results, the launch platforms were already gone by the time such strikes were carried out. High-tech weapons, such as Tomahawks, reportedly worked poorly due to clouds, rain, smoke, and moisture. Their performance was insufficient when identifying targets or destroying them. At those times, the Special Air Service (SAS) of Britain rescued U.S. troops from the predicament. They penetrated into the Iraqi territory and guided precision-guided munitions fired by U.S. troops to Iraq's launch platforms by irradiating the moving launch platforms with a laser.

What about the case of North Korea? More than 100 ballistic Nodong missiles with a range of 1,300 kilometers that can be fitted with nuclear arms are deployed in North Korea, targeting Japan. Many of them are placed on mobile launch platforms. The remaining ones will reportedly be launched from semi-underground silos built in

TOKYO 00001357 006 OF 020

hollowed-out solid bedrock. The difficulty of striking moving launch platforms was proven in the Gulf War. Powerful bunker-buster bombs are needed to destroy such bedrock. The infiltration of a special unit must be considered.

Since there are so many difficult issues, it is impossible for Japan to possess the capability to strike enemy bases on its own. It is, therefore, necessary for the government to ensure that the U.S. shares Japan's perception of the threat of North Korea's nuclear arms and confirm that in the event Japan were attacked by the North, the U.S. would retaliate without fail, based on the right to collective self defense. In the meantime, both Japan and the U.S. must speed up efforts to compile an operation program, premised on attacking enemy bases. Such issues as role-sharing between the

Self-Defense Forces and U.S. forces will be made clear through that process. This reporter believes that these are the only deterrence measures Japan can adopt at present.

Regarding this issue, the government indicated its view more than half a century ago that the Constitution is not intended to mean that even if attacks by ballistic missiles, etc., are expected, the nation should do nothing. This type of approach is considered to be within the scope of self-defense. However, this issue has never been discussed until this time in which Japan is confronted with this worst-case scenario of North Korea starting to possess the capability to launch nuclear missiles. How can the security of our country be maintained? There is not much time left before an answer has to be formulated.

(4) Foreign Ministry fears public opinion; Prime Minister must lead the denuclearization effort without leaving everything to the United States

ASAHI (Page 17) (Excerpts)
June 13, 2009

Soichiro Tahara, journalist

North Korea conducted an underground nuclear test on the morning of May 25. It was the North's second nuclear test after the one in October 2006. Furthermore, the country seems to be aiming at launching a long-range ballistic.

The North test fired a long-range ballistic missile on April 5 in the name of a satellite. The country also declared that the Six-Party Talks were unnecessary and that it would reopen its nuclear facilities and then conducted its second nuclear test. Why does North Korea repeat acts that irritate other countries, especially China and Russia, its supporters?

General Secretary Kim Jong Il is clearly hoping for bilateral talks with the United States instead of the Six-Party Talks.

President Obama announced even before taking office that he would actively pursue dialogue with all countries. This made Kim Jong Il believe that Obama would approach North Korea at an early time. But preoccupied with the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan issues, Obama did not pay attention to North Korea. Frustrated, Kim Jong Il conducted missile and nuclear tests in order to grab his attention.

In response to the missile tests, Japan strongly called for a UN Security Council resolution to impose sanctions on the North. But in

TOKYO 00001357 007 OF 020

the end, the Security Council adopted a nonbinding presidential statement due to China's reluctance. All countries expressed anger with the nuclear test, and a UN Security Council resolution was expected, although China was likely to fiercely oppose the adoption of strong economic sanctions. Attention was focused on how well the United States would be able to persuade China.

But U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner traveled to Beijing from late May through early June to hold talks with President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao, and other Chinese leaders. If the U.S. was to ask China to fall in step with other countries about imposing severe sanctions on North Korea, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton should have flown to Beijing. The purpose of Geithner's visit to China was probably to "ask" Beijing to purchase U.S. government bonds and so on.

Around that time, Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg was in Tokyo insisting that the United States, Japan, and South Korea must play a central role in realizing an extremely harsh sanctions resolution. This clearly conflicted with Geithner's act.

On June 10, seven UN members -- the five permanent UNSC members plus Japan and South Korea -- reached a final agreement on a draft sanctions resolution on North Korea. It said, "UN member states are urged to conduct inspections," an expression with no binding power, in line with China's assertion. Member countries are also asked in

the resolution not to shift funds and assets leading to nuclear development and also not to extend financial aid except for humanitarian and development purposes. In other words, the United States made major compromises to China.

In my view, the United States thinks that Kim Jong Il's health condition is unexpectedly bad from information that Kim Jong Il's third son, Kim Jong Un, has been picked as the next leader and that the North conducted its latest nuclear test in connection with this situation. I also think the United States remains unable to determine the capability of Kim Jong Il, or of North Korea rather, as the party concerned. If so, I think it is Japan's time to play a role.

On April 5 in Prague, President Obama declared that the United States will seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons, while referring to its moral responsibility as the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, namely on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The declaration was epochal.

The United States is the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, and Japan is the only country to have suffered atomic bombs. That is why Japan and Prime Minister Taro Aso, by teaming up with President Obama, should strongly call upon the nuclear powers for denuclearization and nuclear abolition.

Simply put, North Korean nuclear weapons are not really a threat to such nuclear powers and the United States, China, and Russia, but are a serious threat to Japan. Furthermore, it is said that 150 - 320 Nodong missiles are in a condition to be launched at Japan at any time.

In addition, Japan needs nearly 1 trillion yen to normalize ties with North Korea for the economic recovery of that country. Well aware of it, Kim Jong Il must be waiting for money from Japan.

TOKYO 00001357 008 OF 020

A Japanese prime minister flew to Pyongyang twice to hold long talks with Kim Jong Il. Such has not been done by any other countries. I wonder if it is right for Japan and Prime Minister Aso to leave negotiations with China and North Korea entirely to the United States.

I believe that Japan should hold talks with North Korea and that Japan is more qualified than any other countries to negotiate with the North.

Regrettably, there are no substantial talks between Japan and North Korea at present. Why do the Japanese government and the Foreign Ministry not try to embark on full-fledged talks (with North Korea)?

When former U.S. President George W. Bush decided to delist North Korea as a state sponsor of terrorism in October 2008, I asked a senior Foreign Ministry official, "Isn't it a betrayal of Japan?" North Korea had pledged that it would reinvestigate the fate of the eight Japanese abductees it earlier announced dead without offering any concrete grounds, but the country did not fulfill its responsibility. That was why I asked that question.

In response to my question, the senior official cautiously said: "In pushing ahead with talks with North Korea, the United States had two challenges. One was to nail down the issue of denuclearization. The other was Japan-DPRK relations, namely the abduction issue. But for them, denuclearization was the main topic. Their stance was to discuss the abduction issue as much as possible. They think they have given enough time to Japan, I think."

In mid-January 2007 in Berlin, talks were held between then U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill and North Korean Vice-Foreign Minister Kim Kye Gwan. Japan had over one year since then to hold talks with North Korea but the country did not do so, and the United States probably lost its patience.

The official continued: "We of course tried to hold talks, but we

could not find prospects for holding talks in a way that was acceptable to the Japanese public."

What do his words "we could not find prospects for talks in a way that was acceptable to the Japanese people" mean?

What the Foreign Ministry was really afraid of was not North Korea per se but Japanese public opinion.

Simply put, talks that are acceptable to the Japanese public are to confirm that the eight abductees are still alive and to bring them back to Japan.

Regarding that such is next to impossible, the Japanese government might think that it is safer not to conduct full-fledged talks with the North.

A senior official made an interesting account: "Prime Minister Koizumi's visit to North Korea ended up working completely against Pyongyang's plan and the Japanese delegation's wishes. Kim Jong Il admitted the abductions of Japanese nationals and offered an apology. He also apologized for the spy ships. The North also allowed five abductees to return to Japan and presented data on the remaining eight. They hoped that this would help ease Japan's anger

TOKYO 00001357 009 OF 020

with the North, thereby opening the door for normalization talks with Japan. But in reality, Japanese people's sentiment toward the North deteriorated. And Japan completely lost its confidence."

I think this is what really lies at the bottom of the Foreign Ministry. Koizumi's trip to North Korea has been a trauma.

On May 19, Foreign Minister Hirofumi Nakasone announced, "The ministry's position is that the Japanese abductees are all alive in North Korea." As long as Japan holds this view, North Korea will not accept Japan's call for talks.

Japan should hold talks with the United States, China, and North Korea. But in reality, Japan, fearing public opinion, remains unable to enter into full-fledged talks with the North. It is disgraceful that Japan effectively leaves talks with China and North Korea to the United States.

The United States had information on the North's latest nuclear test in advance. But regrettably, I understand that the United States did convey that information to Japan. Furthermore, according to a Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) executive, China has rejected Japan's request for telephone summit talks since North Korea's nuclear test. And there have been no bilateral talks with North Korea.

Prime Minister Aso should fly to the United States right away to learn what President Obama really wants to do with North Korea, and then to visit China to hold talks with President Hu Jintao, and finally to fly to Pyongyang to directly negotiate with Kim Jong Il.

(5) Financial Services Agency to call for thorough identity verification in relation to DPRK sanctions

NIKKEI (Page 4) (Abridged)
June 16, 2009

At a news conference on June 15, Finance Services Agency Commissioner Takafumi Sato said that in relation to financial sanctions on North Korea, "we are considering asking banking institutions to thoroughly verify identity and report suspicious transactions without fail." With regard to sanctions on the DPRK, a meeting of the G-8 financial ministers agreed over the weekend that effective financial sanctions in accordance with the UN Security Council resolution should be implemented.

(6) Editorial: Monetary authorities of Japan, U.S., and Europe should give consideration to long-term interest rates

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
June 14, 2009

A meeting of finance ministers from the Group of Eight (G-8) countries was held in Lecce, Italy, on June 12-13. A joint statement issued at the close of the meeting noted: "There are signs of stability in the global economy," in part due to the effects of the fiscal and financial policy measures taken since last fall. The appearance of positive signs for the global economy should be welcomed, but there is also a new source of concern - the recent rise in long-term interest rates.

In trade last week, the yield on 10-year government bonds, an indicator of 10-year U.S. long-term interest rates, briefly surged

TOKYO 00001357 010 OF 020

to the 4 PERCENT level for the first time in about eight months. The yield on Japan's newly floated 10-year government bonds also marked its highest level in seven and a half months at 1.56 PERCENT. European bond yields have also been on the rise.

There are two major causes for the rise in long-term interest rates. One is a change in views among market players of the future of the economy. In the wake of the outbreak of the global financial crisis set off by the Lehman shock last fall, market players began to harbor concern that the global economy might continue to sink deeper into recession. Long-term interest rates also dropped sharply, reflecting apprehension that the global recession could be prolonged.

In the early spring, however, positive signs began to appear in economic indicators of the U.S. and other countries. Also because the U.S. took proactive measures to stabilize its financial system and provide financial assistance to leading automakers, the observation that the global economy has emerged from its worst period has been gradually spreading.

The second cause is the issuance of large amounts of government bonds to cover the decrease in tax revenues and the increase in government disbursements to cope with the economy's downward tumble. Not only Japan but also the U.S. and European countries have floated large amounts of government bonds, so some are worrying about a possible downgrade of bonds. The recent rise in interest rates stems from both positive and negative factors - economic turnaround and deteriorated balance between supply and demand as a result of large amounts of government bonds issued and concerns about future financial conditions.

Since last fall, various countries have increased government spending to prevent the economy from further worsening. This was proper policy coordination. Even so, we should interpret the recent rise of long-term interest rates as a message from the market warning that unless efforts are made to restore fiscal health even after the economy perks up, it will be dangerous.

The joint statement at the G-8 meeting referred to the need for considering exit strategies for winding down extraordinary policy measures. The G-8 countries supposedly took this warning from the market into consideration.

The global economy is emerging from its worst period, but it has yet to return to a recovery track. The labor markets of Japan and the U.S. are still reeling, and the U.S. and Europe have not completely resolved their financial system problems. When exit strategies are considered, full consideration must be also be given to economic conditions. It is imperative to accurately read the messages sent by the market.

(7) Warning about three anti-U.S. stances - Part one of series "DPJ's risky 'fraternal' foreign policy"

SANKEI (Pages 1, 3) (Full)
June 16, 2009

"If the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) presents all its policies at once, they might be perceived by the U.S. Congress and the Obama administration as anti-U.S. You should be careful."

The word "anti-U.S." resounded in the quiet room like an emergency alarm. This was at a meeting between senior DPJ officials and U.S. experts on defense and security who are knowledgeable about Japan on the morning of December 19 at a room in the Imperial Hotel in downtown Tokyo.

Participants from the DPJ included (then) Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama, (then) Deputy President Naoto Kan, and (then) Vice Presidents Katsuya Okada and Seiji Maehara. Two heavyweights affiliated with the U.S. Democratic Party, former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye and John Hamre, president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) (former deputy secretary of defense); former National Security Council director for Asia Michael Green, who was in charge of policy toward Japan during the former Republican Bush administration; and former Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly attended from the U.S. side.

Unclear picture of the future

Nye, who was the first to issue the "warning" about the DPJ being seen as "anti-U.S.," stared at Hatoyama, Kan, and his colleagues and raised three specific issues, instead of issuing them a yellow card:

- (1) Immediate discontinuation of the Maritime Self-Defense Force's (MSDF) refueling support mission in the Indian Ocean;
- (2) Review of the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) ;
- (3) Scrapping of the U.S. Forces Japan (USFJ) realignment plans, including the relocation of U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam and the relocation of Futenma Air Station

All these were part of the DPJ's campaign pledges, which had been included in its latest policy collection, the "Policy Index 2008."

According to a participant in the meeting, Nye stressed: "If you don't want to be perceived as anti-American, you should discuss specific issues after presenting a total package of proposals for Japan-U.S. cooperation." While he talked calmly, it was obvious that that his opinion incorporated a warning to the DPJ for its anti-U.S. stances.

The problem, though, is that no one has any idea what the future of the Japan-U.S. alliance might be under a DPJ administration.

Kan and his colleagues explained, "The Japan-U.S. relationship will remain the cornerstone of Japan's foreign and security policy under a DPJ administration." The meeting ended in about 45 minutes. Yet, six months after that, a participant on the U.S. side still asks: "Would it really be all right if the DPJ were to run the Japanese government?"

Leaving the umbrella partially

This individual has been asking Hatoyama, Okada and others every time he met them after the December meeting about what contribution could Japan make on the Afghan issue, which is of great importance to the Obama administration. Yet, the response from Hatoyama and the others, according to that person, "has been mostly vague, and it remains unclear what they intend to do."

Not only is the future picture of the alliance unclear; there are even dangerous elements in the DPJ's plans for a new administration

that may destroy the alliance from its very foundation.

In the July issue of Sekai, Okada talks about "partial coverage by the U.S. nuclear umbrella." He asserts that Japan should: (1) make the U.S. pledge it will not use nuclear weapons for a preemptive strike; (2) build a consensus on making the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states illegal; and (3) present a framework for a denuclearized zone in Northeast Asia.

Since the war, Japan has consistently relied on the expanded deterrence (nuclear umbrella) provided by the U.S. as the ultimate means to guarantee its security and survival. The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty (security alliance) incorporates all the political, foreign affairs, military, and security aspects of this relationship. However, with North Korea's repeated nuclear tests, there is indeed a growing nuclear threat from North Korea and China.

The reason why Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has been emphasizing that the U.S. "guarantees Japan's security" each time North Korea conducts a nuclear or missile test is because she wanted to maintain the credibility of the nuclear umbrella. What does Okada mean by venturing out from the nuclear umbrella at a time the umbrella for Japan and the ROK needs to be reinforced?

Disintegration of Japan-U.S. alliance possible

A defense expert pointed out: "Expanded deterrence is the very essence of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. If you are in favor of such, you should accept the Security Treaty, if not, Japan should embark on its own nuclear armament or opt for unarmed neutrality." The expert warned that the very foundation of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements may be jeopardized. What lies ahead if Japan tries to leave the nuclear umbrella after the refueling operation in the Indian Ocean is discontinued, the USFJ realignment plans are scrapped, and SOFA is revised? One thing for sure is that the Japan-U.S. alliance will disintegrate.

The birth of a genuine anti-U.S. administration that will implement the "set of three anti-U.S. stances" that Nye had warned about is fast approaching.

Let us take a closer look at the foreign and security policies of the DPJ under Hatoyama, whose slogan is "fraternity (yuai)."

The United States' concern is that it is unable to tell whether a new Hatoyama administration will adopt the "Tomiichi Murayama model" or the "Roh Moo Hyun model."

After becoming prime minister, Murayama, who was chairman of the Japan Socialist Party, made statements in the Diet accepting the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) as constitutional and vowing to maintain the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. Making an about-face from his previous position that the SDF was unconstitutional, he came to recognize the Japan-U.S. alliance as the cornerstone of Japan's foreign policy.

On the other hand, the late President Roh Moo Hyun became increasingly populist, anti-U.S., and leftist after his inauguration. Alarmed by this, the U.S. tried to prepare for a setback in the U.S.-ROK alliance by subtle adjustments in the U.S. military strategy and troop deployment through the realignment of

TOKYO 00001357 013 OF 020

the U.S. forces in Korea.

Overall picture unclear

The main reason why it is difficult to tell whether the DPJ will shift from its anti-U.S. stance or reinforce this tendency is because of the party's foreign and security affairs policies. The policies, says James Przystup, senior research fellow at the National Defense University, are "as many as there are party members and are incoherent: You cannot really tell which will be implemented."

Even Seiji Maehara, one of the DPJ's foreign and security policy experts, admits that the overall picture is unclear: "From the American point of view, they know Maehara; they know (Akihisa) Nagashima; they know Okada; but they do not know the DPJ."

Maehara and Nagashima are close to Assistant Secretary of State-designate Kurt Campbell and other experts on Japan who believe that the alliance is important. Their picture of the alliance is

slightly different from Hatoyama's and Kan's conception of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements. They understand the significance of the nuclear umbrella and differ with Okada on the "framework for a denuclearized zone." In addition to the differences between Maehara and Nagashima on the one hand and Okada on the other, Hatoyama and Kan also differ in their policies.

Hatoyama once called for a "security treaty without permanent stationing of American troops" and presented a plan for relocating most of the U.S. forces now in Japan outside of the country. He would ask them to come to Japan's rescue only in an emergency. Kan has also advocated a relocation of U.S. military bases to other countries.

Foreign affairs commentator Yukio Okamoto is very critical of such thinking. He issues a strong warning: "This is like telling your wife I don't want to see you anymore and driving her out of the house, but then ordering her to 'come back and take care of me when I get sick'." "Such an attitude of taking only the good part will damage trust between Japan and the U.S."

Meanwhile, a case study of what would happen if Hatoyama became prime minister is being discussed in the DPJ.

Appearing on a TV program in late May, Keiichiro Asao, defense minister in the DPJ's "Next Cabinet", said: "Based on the campaign pledges, he will first announce the immediate discontinuation of the refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. Second, the USFJ realignment plans, including Futenma relocation, will be scrapped." When asked about the DPJ administration's policy on the refueling mission, he responded immediately: "We will withdraw (the MSDF)."

Nicholas Szechenyi, deputy director of the CSIS Japan chair, predicts that "it will be very unfortunate for Japan and the U.S." if the Hatoyama administration stops the refueling mission and abandons the USFJ realignment plans.

Giving up on Japan?

There is also the question of the SOFA and host nation support. Okada told the press at a news conference on June 12: "In addition to the location of U.S. military bases, which is a legacy of the

TOKYO 00001357 014 OF 020

postwar regime, other bilateral problems exist, such as the need to review the SOFA and host nation support." A drastic review of SOFA and host nation support is a major election pledge of the DPJ.

However, there is a long history behind the operation of the SOFA and the providing of host nation support. Since this also affects relations with NATO, the ROK, and other allies, U.S. government officials and people like Michael Green are seriously concerned.

No matter how hard the DPJ advocates a "true Japan-U.S. alliance" in its policy manifesto, it is not hard to imagine how the U.S. side will react in this context. One can safely say that the "set of three anti-U.S. stances" -- cancelling the refueling mission, revising the SOFA, and scrapping USFJ realignment -- are key to gauging the DPJ's true intent regarding the future of the bilateral alliance.

Yuki Tatsumi, who looks at the bilateral relationship from a think tank in the U.S., points out that his most serious concern about a DPJ administration taking over in Japan is that: "They have not thought seriously about what the option of independence from the U.S. really means."

The U.S. is promoting greater strategic cooperation with countries in Asia and the Pacific other than Japan, such as the ROK, Australia, and Singapore. While the possibility of the U.S. giving up on Japan and strengthening relations with other allies and cooperative countries instead is not high, if Japan remains complacent in thinking "it is impossible for the Japan-U.S. alliance to go away," the U.S. may indeed end up giving up on Japan. In that case, a G-2 framework consisting of the U.S. and China may emerge.

What Tatsumi is talking about is precisely the "structure of dependence (amae-kouzou)" on the U.S. The DPJ's presumptuous attitude and its self-righteous security policy have made the likelihood of the alliance disintegrating from the Japanese side stronger than ever.

(8) Japan must formulate security policy in context of relations with Asia

SEKAI (Excerpts)
July, 2009

Interview with Katsuya Okada, Lower House member and DPJ secretary general:

Signs of spring appearing for nuclear disarmament

-- Mr. Okada, you have discussed as a lawmaker the issue of nuclear disarmament, and the Democratic Party of Japan's (DPJ) Diet Members League to Promote Nuclear Disarmament, which you chair, has announced a plan for a treaty to make Northeast Asia a nuclear-weapons free zone.

President Barack Obama said in a major speech in Prague on April 5: "We must realize a world free from nuclear weapons. As the only nuclear power that has used nuclear weapons, the U.S. has a moral responsibility to address the challenge of nuclear abolition." What do you think about his speech?

Okada: Because President Obama in the past has referred to the

TOKYO 00001357 015 OF 020

nuclear issue at every crucial juncture, I had the impression that he must be interested in that problem, in contrast to previous presidents, such as George W. Bush. After India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, moves to eliminate nuclear weapons went into hibernation but I see signs of the start of spring finally appearing.

President Obama has said the U.S. will resume negotiations with Russia before the First Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START1), signed in 1991, loses effect this December. In 2007, former U.S. political or military leaders, such as Kissinger, Nunn, Shultz, and Perry, called on the international community to promote the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Their joint call drew much attention as a major U.S. policy switch. Obama's statement is an extension of that trend. I feel that a new trend different than anything before has been created in the U.S. and that President Obama has solidified this trend.

-- The Japanese government has expressed its welcome of the new U.S. policy and its willingness to offer cooperation, but at the same time, it has expressed its unwillingness to see the U.S. nuclear deterrent will weaken.

Okada: In an earlier Budget Committee meeting, when I asked Prime Minister Aso for his view about Obama's Prague speech, he replied: "It was the most impressive speech I have ever heard." I, too, praised it, but I then quoted the foreign minister and the Foreign Ministry as saying in a Diet reply, as well as in a report, that it would not be desirable if the U.S. announced a policy of no preemptive nuclear strikes because that would undermine nuclear deterrence. I pointed out the inconsistency in what the ministry was saying. In short, when it comes to specific arguments, the prime minister remains unresponsive.

The Japanese government has also advocated nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. But it only presented a resolution calling for abolition of nuclear weapons to the United Nations, and has made no further efforts. The government is not eager to actually take any action.

Moreover, when the Bush administration adopted a policy of distancing itself from nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation efforts, Japan did not offer any advice or views. This time, Japan has only echoed President Obama's call for nuclear disarmament. Such

a stance naturally tends to evoke the criticism that the government has just blindly followed U.S. policy.

Nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation should be a key element in Japan's foreign policy. Some people are worrying about how Japan has been seen in the international community. In order to brush off such concern, Japan should present its own ideas. I think Japan should make three proposals: (1) The U.S. and other nuclear powers should declare they will not launch a preemptive strike; (2) agreement should be reached on the view that a nuclear strike on countries having no nuclear weapons is illegal; and (3) a nuclear-free zone should be established in Northeast Asia.

-- When Japan criticized India's nuclear test, India claimed that Japan, which has been protected under the U.S. nuclear umbrella, has no right to criticize it. Japan should take the initiative in promoting the elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide, but Japan has to depend on the nuclear umbrella. This situation is certainly

TOKYO 00001357 016 OF 020

inconsistent.

Okada: Even if the U.S. makes a "no first use" declaration, it does not mean that Japan will be placed outside the scope of the umbrella. Under the situation in which nuclear weapons actually exist in the world, we naturally feel anxious of a possible removal of the umbrella.

I have advocated Japan possibly being placed under partial coverage of the umbrella, but I have never said that Japan should not counterattack if it unfortunately comes under nuclear attack. The option of counterattack should be left as a guarantee. So I want you to understand that I have not made only idealistic suggestions.

-- North Korea's nuclear and missile development programs are considered to be a major threat to Japan. The DPRK fired a rocket (over Japan) on April 5 and conducted a second nuclear test on May 125. These moves generated calls in Japan for discussing preemptive strike and enemy base-strike options. Is the concept of a nuclear-free zone in Northeast Asia an alternative to discussing these options?

Okada: North Korea's nuclear test, which runs counter to the trend in the international community of building a nuclear-free world, is extremely regrettable. UN Security Council members need to discuss this problem and take joint steps against North Korea, going further than what they have done so far. In dealing with North Korea, however, I do not think the nuclear umbrella is absolutely necessary. Conventional weapons will probably be enough. Instead, China's nuclear threat is the premise when discussing the nuclear umbrella.

North Korea's scrapping of its nuclear programs is the main precondition for the Northeast Asia nuclear-free zone concept, but a post-nuclear abolition vision has yet to be laid out. That is a problem. It is necessary to have North Korea promise to denuclearize itself and the U.S. and China promise not to use nuclear weapons. Under this concept, Japan, South Korea and North Korea, which are in the region, as well as the U.S., China and Russia, which are nuclear powers located near the region, would conclude a nuclear-free zone treaty. The countries in the region would promise not to test, possess and use nuclear weapons. The three nuclear powers would promise not to use nuclear weapons or pose a nuclear threat against the countries in the region.

If the UNSC pressures North Korea to renounce its nuclear ambitions without presenting a vision of what would happen North Korea's denuclearization, it is unconceivable that it will meekly acquiesce.

A number of nuclear-free zone treaties exist in Africa, South Africa, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and many other regions in the world. If more nuclear-free zones are set up and if these areas are linked to each other and establish an encircling net around the nuclear powers, it will become possible to apply pressure to the nuclear powers to scrap their nuclear arms.

Consider security policy in context of relations with Asia

-- In your book "Aiming for a change of government," you reiterated your determination to establish a government totally different from that of the Liberal Democratic Party. You promised to give priority

TOKYO 00001357 017 OF 020

to the interests of ordinary citizens, taxpayers and consumers in mapping out policies. You also promised to give more shape to the principles in the Constitution, such as popular sovereignty, respect for basic human rights, and pacifism. Based on this stance, where will you place emphasis in formulating a security policy for the next generation?

Okada: Although I am aware that some say if the DPJ government takes over political power, the alliance will be shaken, our party does place emphasis on the Japan-U.S. alliance. But since the two countries have their own national interests, they need to coordinate views. I do not think that Japan always needs to fall in step with the U.S. as its ally.

When I visited the U.S. recently, I told those whom I met that we Japanese felt it was very regrettable for the U.S. to have removed North Korea from its list of terrorism-sponsoring nations. I do not think this remark undermined Japan-U.S. relations. I told them that since the U.S. has its own policy and its own circumstances, it naturally takes a different position from Japan.

Once the DPJ comes into power, the party must discuss specific issues, including the Futenma relocation plan issue. I think the party must maintain the basic stance of giving priority to the Japan-U.S. alliance.

It is also important to place emphasis on Asia. When I was serving as party president, I announced my vision in which I said that priority should be given to Asia first and then to the Japan-U.S. alliance. It was surprising that this view triggered a controversy, but I think Japan is very lucky because it is located in the Asia region, where the economies of nations are closely interlinked. Japan should pursue affluence in an East Asia community, centering on the Asian region, and also help build peace. Based on the view that stability should be brought in the region through economic exchanges, the Japanese government should formulate an Asia policy.

-- Various evaluations have been made of the Koizumi administration, but it is true that Japan's relations with Asia, particularly, with China and South Korea, became seriously strained during that period.

Okada: Relations with the ASEAN countries also turned sour. Until then, Japan and ASEAN countries had established very close ties, but ASEAN and China became much closer. It is truly regrettable that Japan's relations with China and South Korea deteriorated due to the prime minister's visits to Yasukuni Shrine. A five-year vacuum was created in our country's policy toward Asia.

-- On the security front, keeping favorable relations with neighbors is imperative. Some speculate that a military clash could occur in East Asia in the future, but that is open to question.

Okada: You are right. Although I said that China is behind the need for a nuclear umbrella, interdependent relations have deepened in the economic area in the region. We would like to build a relationship with China in which we can discuss military disarmament. I mean such discussion should also include the U.S., that is, the U.S. military.

-- When State Secretary Clinton visited Japan, Japan and the U.S. concluded a Guam transfer agreement, and the accord went into effect

TOKYO 00001357 018 OF 020

in May. The people of Okinawa have fiercely reacted to the pact, claiming their will was ignored. The DPJ is against the accord,

isn't it?

Okada: The accord is premised on the transfer of Futenma Air Station. If these two plans had been handled separately, we would have taken a different stance. Since they have been made a set, we oppose the accord.

-- The two countries might have decided to treat them as a package, fearing the Guam plan might not be implemented if it was handled independently. In Okinawa, there is even the speculation that both sides decided to reach a governmental agreement so that the plan will be implemented even under a DPJ government.

Okada: There is another view that the handling of the plans in a package was intended to make the DPJ raise its opposition. Particularly on the Futenma plan, we have insisted its functions be transferred to somewhere outside the prefecture or Japan. Okinawa Prefecture and the central government have yet to reach an agreement, so I think this issue should be discussed more thoroughly. The problem is that there are two major U.S. military bases - Kadena and Futenma - on a very small island, Okinawa, and that such a situation might last for another 30 or 50 years. If Futenma is relocated to another area in Okinawa, the base will stay there forever. It is necessary to have the U.S. think about it some more. The relocation issue should be discussed more thoroughly.

-- Japan has always formed a security policy reflecting and responding to U.S. policy.

Okada: Japan is still living in the shadow of the last war. The current state of Okinawa being pressed with a heavy base burden is a result of the miserable ground battle on that island. U.S. Marines must be thinking that they acquired the bases through a bloody battle. So they probably will not easily give up the bases.

However, decades have passed since the San Francisco Treaty was signed, and the postwar period has already ended. It is now necessary to discuss whether the concentration of U.S. bases on Okinawa is normal. I think such a discussion is possible under the Obama administration.

-- You proposed stabilizing the region under the Northeast nuclear-free zone concept. Is this idea linked to a plan to reduce U.S. bases in Okinawa, which is the U.S. military's strategic point in the Far East region?

Okada: Of course, there is such an aspect, but the U.S. has seen the bases in Okinawa in the context of its Asia strategy and also its global strategy. Even so, there are so many U.S. military bases in Okinawa. I have to say that their retrenchment and reallocations must be considered. In realigning U.S. forces in Japan, consideration naturally should be given to this point.

It is also necessary for our side to prepare a security policy or a diplomatic policy to that end in a positive manner. I just said that the Futenma base should be transferred to somewhere outside Okinawa, but it might be unrealistic to think there is a local government willing to host the base.

Even so, if we think the current situation of the Futenma base is a

TOKYO 00001357 019 OF 020

problem, we must make efforts to find a new host municipality. This challenge is not easy, but since the government has erased the option of moving the base somewhere outside the prefecture, there will be no change in the state of bases permanently stationed in Okinawa.

Information disclosure will deepen democracy

-- You have said that (if the DPJ assumes political power), you will disclose the details of secret treaties having to do with Okinawa. In my view, since the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty contains provisions contradictory to the Constitution, particularly during the post-Cold War period, Japan and U.S. concluded many secret agreements in order to carry out operations. I think the so-called secret agreement on

the reversion of Okinawa is a typical one.

Okada: I have promised to disclose all information, including the secret agreement on Okinawa reversion, if we assume political power. A change of government has not taken place for such a long time that transparency of information has not been guaranteed.

When the problem of the USS Kitty Hawk refueled by a Maritime Self-Defense Force's ship in the Indian Ocean came to light, I felt strongly about that issue. The U.S. government revealed almost all parts of the Kitty Hawk's logbooks, but the Japanese government refused to release information regarding the supply ship. Both sides' responses were totally different.

In Japan, information inconvenient to the government tends to be concealed from the public at the bureaucrats' discretion. There are even cases in which people in Japan do not know what was already disclosed in the U.S. or in South Korea. Such a situation must be rectified immediately. Only our party, which is free from any fetters, can do that.

We must not do what we cannot explain about later. But if we dare explain why we did it, the people might understand our option. I believe information disclosure will deepen public understanding about the nation's foreign policy. This is very important in light of popular sovereignty, and once the government is replaced, information will be easily disclosed.

Former Vice Foreign Minister Shotaro Yachi said that although there was a secret agreement on Okinawa reached by only four persons, the accord has already become a dead letter (noted in the May 22, 2009, issue of the Shukan Asahi). At that time, the presence of the secret agreement itself was significant, because Japan was able to use it as a bargaining chip in negotiations with the U.S. government. Japan should have disclosed the secret agreement at a certain point.

Learning the presence of the secret accord, some might claim it is outrageous, but others might think that then Prime Minister Sato had no choice but to make this bitter decision. I think democracy will deepen as a result of different views presented.

(9) Prime Minister's schedule, June 14, 2009

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
June 16, 2009

Prime Minister's schedule, June 14, 2009

TOKYO 00001357 020 OF 020

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)
June 16, 2009

07:46 Took a walk around the official residence.

10:04 Wedding ceremony and reception for the eldest daughter of former environment minister Shunichi Suzuki at Conrad Hotel in Higashi-Shimbashi.

15:21 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Higashi-Ueno.

16:01 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Higashi-Ogu.

16:50 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Shimane, Adachi Ward.

17:06 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Hirano, Adachi Ward.

17:49 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Itabashi.

18:05 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Nakajuku.

18:29 Visited the office of a candidate expected to run for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election in Nishi-Ikebukuro.

19:10 Arrived at the official residence.

Prime Minister's schedule, June 15, 2009

NIKKEI (Page 2) (Full)

June 16, 2009

10:20 Greeted the Emperor and the Empress at the Japan Art Academy Hall in Ueno Park. Then attended the award ceremony of the Japan Art Academy.

11:26 Sent off the Emperor and the Empress.

12:59 Met with Vice Foreign Minister Yabunaka at the Kantei.

15:01 Party executive meeting in the Diet building. Secretary General Hosoda and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Matsumoto remained.

15:57 Met with Lower House member Yoshitaka Sakurada at the Kantei.

16:15 Met with Finance Minister Yosano, followed by Chairman Katsuhiko Shirai of the Federation of Japanese Private Colleges and University Associations. Chief Cabinet Secretary Kawamura remained. Then met with Internal Affairs Minister Sato and Vice Internal Affairs Minister Takino.

18:01 Peace of Mind Society Realization Conference (PMSRC).

19:07 Dined with PMSRC members.

20:22 Dined with Election Committee Chairman Koga, former foreign minister Komura and former defense minister Kyuma and former METI minister Hiranuma.

22:05 Arrived at the official residence.

ZUMWALT